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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LINCOLN C. WHITE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
WESTERN EMPIRE LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
a corporation, and
A. A. TIMPSON,
Defendants and Appellant.

Case No. 9156

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF CASE
The District Court entered judgment for the
Respondent, Lincoln C. White, against the Appellant, Western Empire Life Insurance Company, for
damages suffered by the Respondent for failure of
the Appellant to comply with its agreement to sell
Western Empire Life Insurance Company capital
stock. Lincoln C. White had bought 60 shares of the
capi'tal stock from the Appellants between December 31, 1957 and January 4, 1958 at a price of
$60.00 per share or $3600.00. The Appellant was
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engaged in an intensive selling campaign of its
capital stock, under the direction of its President,
A. A. Timpson. The extent of the president's activity
and management of the stock selling campaign appears from 'the Minutes of the Meeting of the Board
of Directors of Western Empire Life Insurance
Company. (Ex. 9) At a more appropriate place in
this brief we will quote excerpts of the minutes in
support of this statement. We refer particularly
to the January 4, 1958 meeting (Page 45 of Ex. 9)
'to show that it was of utmost importance 'to the
Appellant that it sell i'ts capital stock. The company
was making a special effort to sell its capital stock
and get in the purchase price forthwith. In order
to sell some stock and get in the money, the president of the Appellant entered into an agreement
with the Respondent to resell at $120.00 per share,
any stock which the Respondent purchased at $60.00
per share, such resale to be made after April1, 1958.
(Ex. 3) Exhibit 3 is on the officia'l Stationery of the
Western Empire Life Insurance Company which
lists A. A. Timpson as 1the President of the company
and the letter is signed by A. A. Timpson as the
President of the company.
1

The Respondent paid the purchase price of 60
shares and later requested Appellant to sell the 60
shares of capital stock for $7200.00, less the commission. Appellan't did not sell the stock and the
2
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judgment against the Appellant results from the
failure and breach of agreement.
Appel1ant contends that the agreement was not
within the authori'ty of the president of the company
or at least that part of the agreement requiring the
company to resell the stock was not within the au thori'ty of the president of the company. It is admitted
that the president had au'thority 'to sell the stock
and receive the money for the benefit of the company but the Appellant disavows that part of the
contract by which the Appellant bound itself to sell
the stock of the Respondent after four months, at
an advance in price. Thus, the Appellant has taken
the benefit of the contract, re'tained the purchase
price received, has never offered to re turn the purchase price but wishes to disassociate itself from
that part of the contract which required the Appellant to seU the capital stock.
1

1

APPELLANT C 0 M P LA I N S OF THREE
FINDINGS MADE BY THE COURT. THESE
FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED BY THIS COURT.
The District Court found as a fact that the
contract made by the corporation through i'ts president agreeing to sell capital stock to the Respondent
and also agreeing after the expiration of four
months that it would resell that capital s tock so
1

3
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sold to the Respondent to a third person at an advance in price was a contract within the authority
of the president of the corporation. The District
Court found that the president of the corporation
was authorized by the Board of Directors to sell
capital stock of 'the Appellant corporation and incidental to making such sales, to agree to making
resale of that stock at an advance in price to a third
person. ( R. 115) That finding of fact numbered
6~ reads as fo'llows:
Tha't the defendant A. A. Timpson, president of the defendant corporation was authorized by the Board of Directors of the said
corporation to sell capital stock of the defendant corporation and that the agreement made
by the defendant corporation with the plaintiff was within the scope of the apparent and
implied authority of the defendant, A. A.
Timpson, as president of the defendant corporation; that the first sentence of Section 1,
Article XI of the By-Laws of Western Empire Life Insurance Company reads as follows:
'The President shall exercise the general
supervision and direction of the affairs of the
company."
That the said A. A. Timpson was not
expressly authorized by the Board of Directors of the defendant corporation to write,
sign and deliver such a letter to the plaintiff.
Appellant argues that the court erred in finding that 'the president of the corporation had author4
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ity to bind the defendant corporation. It seems to
counsel for the Respondent that this specification
of error is stated far more broadly than the Appellant intended. There could be no question that the
corporation authorized i'ts president to sell its capital
stock. We are certain that defendant in tended only
to assert that the part of the agreement which obligated 'the Appellant to sell stock at an advance in
price at a later date was beyond the scope of the
authority granted to the president. It is admitted
that 'the president of the company was an authorized salesman of the Western Empire Life Insurance Company to sell its stock. (R. 14) We refer
to R. 96 where the following evidence appears:

Q. (By Mr. N.J. Cotro-Manes, Attorney
for the Western Life Insurance Company)
Were you a salesman for the company were
you an authorized sa1esman?
A.

Yes sir.

Q.

Talk loud.

A. I was acting as salesman for lhe
company.

Q. Were you duly licensed by the insurance company to sell this stock?
A.

Yes.

With this admission that the Appellant authorized its president to sell its capital stock, the Appellant raises this narrow point:
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The president of the corporation who was duly
au'thorized to sell stock of the company, having entered into a contract for the sale of s'tock 'to the
Respondent and having agreed as part of the contract of sa'le to resell the stock at an advance in price
after the expiration of four months, is this latter
provision of the single contract within the scope
of the authority of the president of the W es tern
Empire Life Insurance Company?
1

In addition to the express admission by the
Appellant and its counsel above quoted (R. 96)
that the president was authorized ~o sell stock, the
minute book of the corporation (Ex. 9) contains
repeated references to this authority having been
granted to the presiden t, in fac't, the president was
the guiding spirit in the sale of the company stock.
Excerpts from the minute book of the corporation
follow:
1

EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF MEETTINGS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:
(9th Paragraph on Page 41 of Minute Book.
(Ex. 9) Meeting of October 21, 1957)
"The new stock issue should be ready
within the month. Mr. Timpson made mention
that the stock available, $300,000. would be
more than needed at this time and suggested
5,000 shares be kept in the treasury and
brought out next year at $120. $10.00 per
6
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share to go to capital and $110.00 into surplus. Mr. Burton made a motion that Mr.
Timpson go into it \vi th the attorney and
actuary and bring their recommendations to
the next Board meeting. Mr. Hollingsworth
seconded the motion. Passed unanimously."
Paragraph 1 on Page 43 of Minu1te Book. Meeting of November 11, 1957)
"Mr. Harmon inquired as to whether or
not the Commissioner would be willing at this
time 'to approve the transaction. Mr. Timpson
replied he had ndt contacted the Commissioner
at present, but would wait until the financial
statement was ready before taking it up with
him."
Paragraph 5 on Page 43 of Minute Book. Meeting of November 11, 1957)
''Mr. Timpson stressed the importance of
the first of the year statement as being most
important to the Company, and that it was
imperative that the $30.00 a share stock be
paid for by the end of the year. It is for the
best good of the Company that the $60.00
stock be sold and paid for also. This statement will determine whether or not the Company will qualify in other states."
(Paragraph 6 on Page 44 of Minute Book. Meeting December 6, 1957)
"Mr. Taylor Burton asked how long it
wou'ld take to get the financial statement out
after the end of the year. Mr. Timpson reported that i't takes several weeks to close
the books and that we expect to get the $30.00
7
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stock issue closed out and most of the $60.00
issue collected for the financial report. There
is $40,000. outs'tanding on the $30.00 issue
and another $180,000.00 to be sold of the
$60.00 issue of stock."
(Paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 - Page 45 of Minute
Book- Meeting January 3, 195'8)
Discussion of the stock issues before the
close of the year's business ensued. Mr. Timpson reported Monday January 6, 1958 would
be the last day of the money on the '$30.00
stock to be turned in and tha't it was desireable to get as much of the $60.00 issue in by
the end of the week as it would help the financial statement. Mr. Hollingworth stated it
was a bad time of the year for everyone and
that if they could take a 1ittle longer to get
the money in it might help the sale of the stock.
1

Mr. Timpson asked the Boards opinion
as to whether or not they should cut the
$60.00 issue now and go into the new stock
issue program. We will be able to go into
Idaho with $50,000.00 of surplus. The low
surplus which we have now is due to the low
cost of the first issue of stock, and most of
the surplus has been spent in Home Office
Expenses, and the office equipment and fixtures cannot be shown as admitted assets
on the financial statement. It will, therefore,
be to the company's advan'tage to promptly
close out with a new issue as soon as possible.
D. R. Norton raised the question of turning the sale of the stock over to a broker. Mr.
Harvey Glade of Provo, Manager of Hogle
Investment Company in Provo contacted Mr.
8
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Norton in regards to the sale of this company's stock and thought he would like to
handle the sale of stock for us. After much
discussion, it was recommended that Mr. Norton look into the possibility of having Mr.
Glade handle the sale of stock.
A motion was made by Keith Knight in
accordance with the board's recommendation
that the $60.00 issue of stock now be withdrawn from the markets as of Monday at 5:00
p.m., January 6, 1958, and that Mr. Timpson
seek the commissioner's approval to sell another issue of stock at $120.00.
The motion was seconded by D. R. Norton and carried unanimously.
The president of the company being authorized
to seU the stock, it was within the scope of his authority to do whatever promoted and accomplished
sales of stock. The president contacted this Respondent to sell stock to him ; the Respondent refused to
purchase. ( R. 30) The president of the Appellan't
corporation then suggested that if the Respondent
would purchase stock, the corporation would sell
the stock for him at a later date at an advance price.
The Respondent would not accept an oral agreement
to that effect and instead insisted that that part of
the agreement must be in writing, signed by the
corporation. ( R. 31 ) .
Two separate letters were execulted purporting
to make an agreement that the stock would be sold
at an advance in price, but the Appeltan t refused to
9
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accept these two proferred letters, but finally accepted a letter executed by the corporation. (Ex. 3)
Respondent then paid the price upon receiving this
written agreement. The sale could not have been
made wi thout the delivery of the agreement to resell
the stock at an advance in price. (R. 31) This incidental agreement to resell the stock was basic to 'the
agreement of the Respondent 'to buy the stock. This
incidental agreement was connected with the authority that had been granted to the president to sell
caprtal stock of the company. The agreement to resell the stock was an integral par't of the agreement,
pursuant to which the respondent purchased the
stock. In the words of 'the late J us'tice Wolfe, his
concurring op'inion in Skirl v. Willowcreek Coal Company, 92 Utah 474 69 P. 2d 502 at 5072 "The work
which the agen't is really authorized to do must be
such that the act which he does and in regard to which
his authority is in question is usual or incidental or
of the same nature or reasonably connected u~1· th that
work or .authority which he actually has. . . ."
(Emphasis added) "The apparent authority of an
agent must be gathered from the facts and circumstances of the transaction as shown by the evidence.
21 R.C.L. 854" U. S. Bond and Finance Corporation
v. National Building and Loan Assoc1~ation, 80 Utah
62, 12 P. 2d 758 a't 7602.
1

In the instant case the facts and circumstances
10
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bring it within that line of cases dealing with the
sales of securities with accompanying agreements
to resell or repurchase, in which cases the courts
jealously regard the rights of the buying public.
This subject is fully annotated at 34 A.L.R. (2d)
519 et. seq. The annotator there makes a distinction
between 'the sale of tangible i terns of personal property accompanied by a provision in the contract
that the seller would subsequently resell the item
of personal property and the sales of in tangible
property such as securities also accompanied by
such agreement 'to resell. The subject of that annotation which is also the subject of this Brief is
stated as follows:
"Is an agen t's agreement made contemporaneously with a sale of personal property,
that the property sdld may be re turned by the
purchaser, or that the principal will repurchase the property from, or resell the property
for, the purchaser, binding upon the principal,
notwithstanding that the agent lacks express
authority to so agree?"
At the very beginning of the annotation, the
annotator makes this su1nmary:
''The cases discused herein fall naturally
in to two primary groupings - those involving sales of stocks, bonds, and dther securities,
and those involving sales of other personal
property. Although the rules of agency applicable to sales of either type are identical, it is
interesting to note that the results reached
by the courts in litigation concerning sales of
1

1

1

11
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securities differ significantly from the results
reached when the matter at issue relates to
sales of other personal property.
Thus, in connection with the securities
sales transactions, courts in a majority of
jurisdictions have taken the view that an
agent's agreement that the purchaser may
return 'the securities, or that the principal
will repurchase them from him, or rese1l them
for him, is binding upon the principal as within the agent's actual authority (that is, within
the authority necessarily implied from the
authority expressly conferred upon, though
not itself a subject of express authorization)
or within his apparent authority (that is, the
authorirty which an innocent purchaser might
reasonably expect him to have).
And even in instances in which there have
been findings that the agent's agreement for
the return, repurchase, or resale of securities
was unauthorized, the courts, through application of the theory of ratification, have frequently granted the purchaser the relief to
which he would have been entitled had the
agreemnt been held to bind the principa1 : in
these cases it has been held that the principal,
by retaining 'the benefits of his agent's contract, is barred from denying the agent's
authority to make the return, repurchase, or
resale agreement which served as an inducement for that contract."
There follows in this annotation the cases which
hold that if an agent is authorized 'to sell stock, that
he has either implied authority or apparent authority to make the agreement to resell the stock. The
12
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cases dealing with the sales of securities and which
support this rule appear on Pages 515 through Page
519. Beginning on 519 fol'lowing cases which the
annotator states "appear to be a minority of jurisdictions" are found the cases which counsel for the
Appellant has stated in his Brief at Page 16. Counsel has particularly referred to Morse v. Illinois
Power and Light Company and M~trray v. Standard
Pecan Company, two Illinois decisions which are
from the minority jurisdictions and it is evident
from the statements by the annotator, at pages 520
and 521 'that the only reason these cases held 'that
i't was not within the scope of authority of the agent
to make an agreement 'to resell the securities was,
that in each of these two cases the agent was not a
general agent but mere'ly a special agent. In those
two cases, the sales were made by a salesman who
was not an Officer of the company. The annotator
at Page 520 states, "The stock salesman was, in the
court's view a special agent with limited authority ... ''.
It is clear therefore, that the president of the
company who is authorized to sell capital stock of
a corporation has implied authority to make a contract to either repurchase the stock or to sell it for
the purchaser. The following appears at 2 Am. Jur.
page 101, note 14.
"In Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. Greene & W.
Teleph. Co. 127 Iowa, 350, 101 N. W. 742, 69 LRA
13
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968, 109 Am St. Rep. 387, the plaintiff recovered
in an action for the par value of certain shares of
stock in the defendant company pursuant to a contract made in the name of the defendant corporation under its corporate sea'l, executed by the president and secretary, whereby the defendant agreed
that in a certain contingency it would repurchase
the plaintiff's stock and pay the par value therefor.
As to the defense that the officers had not authority
in fact to make the contract, the court said, inter
alia: 'It clearly appears from the implied color
which the answers must give in order tha:t the defense may be considered at all, that these officers
did in fact make the contracts as alleged in the petition, under the seal of the corporation, and that the
defendant corporation has had and enjoyed the benefits of such con tracts. This being true, the corporation cannot accept and rtify the contracts in so far
as they were beneficial to it, and repudiate them
in so far as they imposed any liability on its part.
It accepted plaintiff's money on the strength of these
contracts, and cannot, while retaining the same, be
heard to say that its officers had no authority to
make the contracts under which it was received.
This is hornbook law.'"
1

There can be no question that Utah has this
same rule. Floor v. Mitchell, 86 Utah 203, 41 P. 2d
281, holds that a corporation was bound by a separ14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a:te collateral agreement to take 'the property sold,
back, if it proved to be unsatisfactory, although a
separate signed contract contained a provision that
"The seller shall not be bound by any agreements
or represen'tations not contained in this agreement".
This collateral agreement was never brought to the
attention of the corporation. In the instan't case the
corporation did not deny that it was aware of 'the
existence of this written agreement, Ex. 3. The annotation referred to cites this Utah case. Since
our court has held tha't the co'llateral agreement in
tha't case was within the implied and apparent scope
of the authority of the traveling salesman, here
the collateral agreement made by the president of
the company and being 'the only written agreement,
it is within 'the scope of the authority of the president of the corporation. Upon the authorrty of the
case just cited, we respectfully submit that this
court should affirm the decision of the District
Court.
We now dire~t attention to some of the authorities c1ted by Appellants.
The quotation from 2 Am. J ur. 77 on Page 16
of Appellant's Brief reflects the minority view as
is seen by reading further in the Am. Jur. Article
on "Agency" Section 123, Page 101 and the 1959
Pocket Part Supplement to Section 12'3 (Page 14
of 1959 Supp'lemen't) We, therefore quote Section
123 with the supplement added portion:
15
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Section 123. - Authority to Agree for
Repurchase. - It is generally held that an
agent who is authorized merely 'to sell personalty and to coHect and turn over the money for
the same has not the power to bind the principal by an agreement to repurchase the property, which promise is made by the agent as
an inducement to the consummation of the
sale. However, in most cases arising upon
such an agreement to repurchase made by the
agent, the courts, in order to conform with
the justice of the situa'tion, have granted relief to the purchaser on the theory that the
principal, by accepting the purchase money or
the proceeds of the sale, ratifies the agreement of the agent.
The courts in other jurisdictions have
taken the view that an agent's agreement
that the principal wil'l repurchase the property
or resell i't for the buyer is binding upon the
principal as within the agent's actual authority (that is, within the authority necessarily
implied from the authority expressly conferred upon him, though not itself a subject of
express authorization) , or within his apparent
authority (that is, the authority which an innocent purchaser migh't reasonably expect him
to have).
The Lockwi'tz case cited by Appellant states
the general rule that a corporation acts through its
Board of Directors but here the by-laws gave special
powers to the president and the board itself authorized 'the president to sen the capital stock. That
case is not au'thori ty here because here we have only
the narrow question whether the president acted
1

1

16
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within the apparent or implied scope of the authority
that was gran'ted 'to him by the board of directors
and the by-laws of the corporation.
Aggeller v. Musser Seed Company, cited by Appellant on Page 15 of its Brief (a three to two decision) is based upon the facts in tha:t case. The majority opinion indicates that if the supervision and
direction of the affairs of the company had been
delegated to the president (as in this case) , the decision of the majority would have been different.
"\Ve have already quoted the finding of fact #6
of this cour t (R. 115), that the by-laws state: "That
the president shall exercise the general supervision
and direction of the affairs of the company". The
majority opinion does not question the following
authority quoted by the losing party in that case
but simply states: "We are doubtfu1l whether the
facts disclosed by the evidence are sufficient to bring
'the case within the rule announced in the exerpts
last above quoted". The exerpts quoted are at the
top of Page 938 and art taken from Section 2033
and 2034, Fletcher Cyc. Corps. Volume 3 and they
read as follows:
1

1

1

"The management of the en tire business
of a corporation may be entrusted to its president ei'ther by express resolution of the directors or by their acquiescence in a course of
dealings. * * * If the president is expressly
named or a ppoj n ted as general manager, or
17
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if he be put in active charge of all or a part
of the corporate business, or if he is held out
or permitted to act in behalf of 'the corporation in all matters or in regard to matters in
a particular place, then his authority is measured by the rules relating 'to 'the authority of
general or branch managers and not by the
rules relating to the authority of a president
by virtue of his office. * * * If the directors
turn over the full and absolute management
of all corporate affairs to the president and
in no way interfers with his acts, he has
power to do any act which the directors could
authorize or ratify".
The District Court, considering 'the facts and
circumstances in the instant case, made the finding
that the agreement of the Appellant corporation
with the Respondent was within the scope of the
apparent and implied authority of the president of
the Western Empire Life Insurance Company. It is
the responsibility of the trier of the facts to make
the determination as to the scope and extent of the
agent's authority. See subject "Agency" Vol. 2 Am.
J ur., Section 454. It is there stated: "It is the settled
general rule that this question of the scope apd
extent of the agent's authority is to be decided from
all 'the facts and circumstances in evidence and is
to be determined by the triers of the facts. The
apparent authority of an agent to act as the representa:tive of his principal is also to be gathered from
all the facts and circumstances in evidence and
18
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ordinarily this is a question of fact for 'the jury's
determination". Authority cited for this statement
is U. S. Bond and Finance Corporation v. National
B1rilding and Loan Association, 80 Utah 62, 12 P.
2d 758, 17 P. 2d 238. The 1959 cumula:tive supplement to this section cites for the same proposition,
the Utah case of Park v. Moorman Manufacturing
Company, 241 P. 2d 914, 40 A.L.R. 2d 273. At Page
9192 of Park v. Moorman, the following statement
appears: ''The question, like other questions of implied or incidental authority is usual'ly a question of
fact."
The Judge of the District Court acting as the
trier of the fact, has found that this agreement and
the whole of it was within the a u'thori ty of the president of the corporation. There is am pie evidence in
support of 'this finding and that finding should no't
be disturbed by this court. Child v. Child, 8 Utah
(2) 261, 332 P. 2d 981, Christensen v. Christensen,
9 Utah (2) 102, 339 P. 2d 101. In making this finding of fact, the court must have considered tha't the
president of the insurance company, having the authority to sell the capital stock, had 'the authority 'to
perform collateral acts and make collateral agreements which are related to the responsibility of selling the capital stock. Park v. Moorman, 121 Utah
339, 241 P. 2d 914. We quote from Page 919:
"It is also evident that in order to get
19
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

this busines, McCullough had the authority
common to all general managers to perform
collateral acts which were incidental to this
responsibility. As stated in Mechem on
Agency, Se~tion 1781: 'Wherever the doing
of a certain act or the transaction of a given
affair or 'the performance of certain business
is confided to an agent, the authority to so
act will, in accordance wi1th a general rule
often referred to, carry with it by impHcation
the authority to do all of the collateral acts
which are the natural and ordinary incidents
of the main act or business authorized. The
speaking of words, - the making of statements, representations, declarations, admission, and the like - may as easily be such an
incident as the doing of any other sort of act.'
Further, 'Since the authority for the doing of these incidental acts, however' springs
from the authority to do the main act it must
ordinarily end with it. The incidental thing
mus t be a part of the main thing. It must occur before the main act is completely ended:
i't must take place while that is still going on.'
In this case, McCullough's main authority was to sell the product and to train salesmen 'to sell it. In order to do this, certain
statements were required to be made. Such
statements sprang from the main authorization and, in 'this case, were a part of the main
act; occurring before the main act of selling
plaintiff was ended and in fact made while
carrying OU t the main job of selling to the
pla'in tiff."
DISCUSSION OF POINTS 2 AND 4 IN BOTH
OF WHICH APPELLANT CONTENDS THAT
1

1

1
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THE COURT ERRED IN MAKING CERTAIN
FINDINGS.
In Point 2, Appellant complains that the Court
erred in finding that the plaintiff did not receive
a copy of the Offering Circular and in Point 4, that
the Court erred in finding that the plaintiff purchased 60 shares of stock and a'lso erred in finding
that the offer to sell was with respect 'to 60 shares
of stock rather than 20 shares of stock.
In connection with these contentions of Appellant, there is evidence in support of each of these
findings of fact and again the finding of the trier
of the facts should not be set aside. The 'testimony
of the Appellant is that a copy of the Offering Circular was given 'to the Respondent and Respondent
testified that he did not receive it. The court made
a finding that the Respondent did not receive a
copy of the Offering Circular. Against such a finding the case referred to at Page 19 of Appellant's
Brief has no validity for in that case there was a
subscription contract signed by the purchasers of
the stock which contained provisions that "no conditions, agreements, or representations other 'than
those printed above shall bind the company." In the
instant case, there was no signed subscription contract or any fact which ca1ne to Respondent's notice
that an agreement on the part of the company to
resell the stock was beyond the scope of the author21
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i ty of the president of the corporation. Nor is the
case Kilbride v. Moss, also cited at Page 19 of AppeHant's Brief, in point as is evident from the quoted
portion of the case. That case was brought against
an officer of the company and there is nothing in
the decision deal'ing with the question of the scope
of authority of an agent of a corporation.
Appellan't also complains that the court erred
in making two other findings of fact. The cour't
found that the Respondent purchased 60 shares of
stock. (Ex. D-6) is for two checks, one of $1200.00
and one of $2400.00 or a total of $3600.00 which
represents the purchase price of 60 shares of the
capital stock. The checks are those of Lincoln C.
White, the Respondent in this case. The court found
that he purchased these 60 shares of stock. The
Respondent had intended transferring some of these
shares of stock to some fr'iends of his in Denver,
Colorado, but it appeared that these friends later
did not wish to take over these shares of stock.
(R. 35)
I't appears that these findings made by the District Court are supported by evidence and should
not be disturbed.
POINT 3 OF THE APPELLANT IS THAT
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
ALLEGED CONTRACT WAS NOT CONTRARY
TO LAW.
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The appellant argues this proposition from the
viewpoint that this agreement obligated the corporation to redeem its own capital stock and that redemption of its capita'l stock would be violative of
Section 16-2-16, U.C.A. 53. This collateral agreen1ent to resell the stock does not constitute an agreement on the par't of the corporation to redeem the
stock. Even if it did, sub-division "F" of the quoted
section of the statute would permit th'is corporation
to redeem this stock. The evidence shows that redemption would not cause the impairment of that
portion of its assets acquired as consideration for
its sales. The court made a finding of fact that the
corporation had a surplus of $50,000.00 and that
the payment of $6120.00 for the purchase of such
capital stock would not cause the impairment of
that portion of the defendant corporation's assets
which were acquired as consideration for 1ts shares
and then the court went on to conclude that the contract is not contrary to the laws of the Sta:te of
Utah and is not an illegal con tract. This finding of
the court that the purchase of such stock would not
cause the impairment of that portion of its assets
acquired as consideration of l ts sales of stock is fully
supported by the evidence. The Minutes of the meeting of January 3, 1958 already set forth in this brief,
contains the following statement: "Mr. Timpson
asked the Board's opinion as to whether or not they
should cut the $60.00 issue now and go into the new
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stock issue program. We will be able to go into
Idaho with $50,000.00 of surplus". This showed
that the corporation had a $50,000.00 surplus and
i t is permitted to redeem this capita1 stock out of
this surplus.
1

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that the three
points in Appellant's argument deal with Appellant's contention that 'the court erred in making
certain findigs of fact. We have indicated that each
of the findings are sufficiently supported by the
evidence and we respectfully submit that these findings should not be disturbed.
Respondent does not believe that the agreement
made by the Appellant was to redeem its own capita1
stock, but even if it was an agreement to redeem
its own capital stock, it is legal for the corporation
to do so inasmuch as the corporation had a surplus
of $50,000.00 a:t the particular time when it made
this agreement.
We respectfully submit that the judgment of
the District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
WHITE, ARNOVITZ, & SMITH
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent
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